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Abstract 
 
This paper is part of an ongoing investigation of “pragmatic information,” defined in 
Weinberger (2002) as “the amount of information actually used in making a decision.”  
Because a study of information rates led to the Noiseless and Noisy Coding Theorems, 
two of the most important results of Shannon’s theory, we begin the paper by defining a 
pragmatic information rate, showing that all of the relevant limits make sense, and 
interpreting them as the improvement in compression obtained from using the correct 
distribution of transmitted symbols. 
 
The first of two applications of the theory extends the information theoretic analysis of 
the Kelly Criterion, and its generalization, the “horse race”, to a series of races where the 
stochastic process of winning horses and strategies depend on some stationary process, 
including, but not limited to the history of previous races.  If the bettor is receiving 
messages (side information) about the probability distribution of winners, the increase in 
the doubling rate of the bettor's winnings is the pragmatic information of the messages.  
The results presented here are well known in the literature, but they are included as an 
important illustration of the relevance of pragmatic information to finance. 
 
A second application is to the question of market efficiency.  An efficient market is, by 
definition, a market in which the pragmatic information of the “tradable past” with 
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respect to current prices is zero.  Under this definition, we show that markets whose 
returns are characterized by a GARCH(1,1) process cannot be efficient. 
 
Finally, a pragmatic informational analogue to Shannon’s Noisy Coding Theorem 
suggests that a cause of market inefficiency is that the underlying fundamentals are 
changing so fast that the price discovery mechanism simply cannot keep up.  This may 
happen most readily in the run-up to a financial bubble, where investors’ willful 
ignorance degrades the information processing capabilities of the market. 
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Introduction 
 
Weinberger (2002) published a definition of “pragmatic information” as “the amount of 
information in a message that is actually used to make a decision”, or as a measure of the 
amount of meaningful information in a message.  This definition distinguishes pragmatic 
information from the usual (Shannon) measure of information, which refers merely to the 
reduction in uncertainty resulting from the receipt of a message, and not to the meaning 
that the uncertainty reduction has to the receiver.   The most obvious, if not the only 
objective meaning that a message can have to a receiver is in observed changes in 
subsequent behavior; indeed, Weaver made precisely this point in his extended 
introduction to the Shannon paper that began information theory (Shannon and Weaver, 
1962).  Although Shannon’s paper began with a demonstration that his celebrated entropy 
measure was, given a few reasonable conditions, unique, Shannon wrote that the ultimate 
importance of this quantity was not that it obeyed the uniqueness theorem, but that it 
represented the minimum compressed length of a message, a result now familiar as the 
Noiseless Coding Theorem.  Therefore it seems reasonable to ask whether there is an 
equivalent “Noiseless Coding Theorem for Pragmatic Information” and what that might 
mean.   
 
Answering the above question requires some background.  First, the Noiseless Coding 
Theorem was only the first of a series of successively more general results; in that 
Shannon’s result only applied to 
 symbol sequences generated from a finite alphabet, as opposed to the infinite set of 
real numbers, 
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 measurements of the expected length of the encoding, thus leaving open the 
possibility that any individual sequence could have a markedly different compressed 
length. 
 sequences generated by a so-called discrete Markov source, i.e. one in which the 
(stationary) conditional probability of observing each symbol, given the entire past 
history of the sequence, is identical to the conditional probability of observing that 
symbol, given only the most recent N <  ∞ symbols. 
Subsequent attempts to generalize the Noiseless Coding Theorem beyond the above 
restrictions culminated in the Shannon-McMillan-Breiman Theorem (for finite alphabet 
sequences) and its generalization to potentially real valued sequences by Barron (1985).  
These theorems guarantee that, in the limit of long sequences, individual sequences must 
all
2
 have the compressed length per input symbol predicted by the Noiseless Coding 
Theorem.  Furthermore, the class of sequences to which the sequence applies is 
considerably broader than those produced by discrete Markov sources. 
 
An obvious application of the present work is in the prediction, or, per the efficient 
market hypothesis (Brigham and Ehrhardt, 2005), difficulty of prediction of financial time 
series.  Indeed,  
 the weak form of market efficiency is simply the statement that the pragmatic 
information of past returns in predicting future returns is zero; 
 the semi-strong form of market efficiency is simply the statement that the pragmatic 
information of all public information for predicting future returns is zero; 
 the strong form of market efficiency is simply the statement that the pragmatic 
information of all information, including insider information, for predicting future 
returns is zero. 
 
In addition to the Noiseless Coding Theorem, the other landmark result in Shannon’s 
paper was his so-called “Noisy Coding Theorem”, a fundamental limitation on the rate at 
which information can be transmitted through a noisy communications channel.  This 
theorem states that every such channel has a well defined “channel capacity”, a rate 
below which the receiver can detect and correct any transmission errors, so that 
transmission can be made effectively noiseless at any rate below the channel capacity.  
The theorem also states that the receiver cannot, in general, do the same for transmissions 
above the channel capacity.  Again, is there a pragmatic informational analogue to such a 
theorem, and, if so, what might it mean? 
 
This paper is therefore organized as follows:  The section after this introduction provides 
some relevant background, including the formal statements of the above mentioned 
information theoretic results and the ideas surrounding them.  As part of that review, we 
consider a class of processes that are provably not discrete Markov sources  and we argue 
that they are, in fact, better models for financial price series than random walks.  Thus 
motivated, a third section discusses the theoretical underpinnings of measuring pragmatic 
information rates, followed by a section that relates pragmatic information to the 
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generalized Kelly Criterion and to efficient market theory.  The final two sections of the 
paper are considerably less concerned with specific results; the first of these sections 
briefly considers the implications of Shannon’s Noisy Coding Theorem for both the 
theory of pragmatic information in general and its specific application to finance, the 
second presents a summary and some conclusions to be drawn from this work. 
 
We adopt the information theoretic convention that all logarithms are base 2 logarithms, 
unless otherwise noted.  Thus, the information theoretic expressions in this paper have 
units of “bits” (as opposed to the units of “nats” if natural logs were used). 
 
Background 
 
An Introduction to Pragmatic Information 
 
It is tempting to define the pragmatic information of a message, m, as the relative 
entropy, D  (P || Q), of the probabilities of the decision maker’s actions before and after 
receiving m.  This quantity is defined over a finite symbol string A, consisting of 
concatenations of the symbols A1, A2, A3, …, A|A |. drawn from the finite alphabet A, as
3
   
 
D  (P || Q) = Σ A  P (A) log [P(A) ∕ Q(A)],                                    (1) 
 
where P(A) is the probability of A subsequent to the receipt of m and Q(A) is the 
probability of Q beforehand.  The use of the character A to represent this symbol string 
serves as a reminder that these symbols actually represent actions, albeit actions broadly 
construed. 
 
A theorem similar to the Noiseless Coding Theorem, albeit less well known, states that a 
message erroneously compressed using the wrong probabilities, Q (A), when the actual 
symbol probabilities, P(A), will require an additional compressed length equal in 
expected value to the relative entropy between the wrong distribution and the right one.    
Surely, some kind of learning is clearly taking place if the act of compressing the 
sequence can be improved, and the additional amount of compression measures, in some 
sense, the amount that has been learned.  The formal statement of the theorem would 
therefore seem to provide a useful quantification of this learning, as in the   
 
“Wrong Code” Theorem (Cover and Thomas, 1991).  If an encoding that 
would be optimal assuming the wrong probability measure Q(A) is used in place 
of the optimal encoding for the finite symbol string A using the correct probability, 
P(A), then the expected length of the resulting encoding, EP [l(α)] = ΣA P(A) l(A), 
satisfies the bounds 
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 Here, and in the sequel, all logarithms are to the base | A |, where | A | is the size of A, unless otherwise 
indicated.  We also adopt the convention that α denotes a randomly selected symbol, as opposed to A, 
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H  (P) + D (P || Q)  ≤   EP [l(α)]   ≤  H  (P) + D (P || Q)  + 1, 
 
where H  (P) is the entropy of α,D (P || Q) is defined as in (1), and l(α) is the 
length, in symbols, of the encoding of α using Q. 
 
However, as Weinberger (2002) makes clear, pragmatic information is more sensibly 
defined over the ensemble, M, of possible messages.  There, it is assumed that the actual 
message sent, which we will denote as μ, is a random variable with known distribution 
Pr{ μ = m} = φ (m).  In particular, it is shown there that the definition of pragmatic 
information as the mutual information between M and the ensemble of outcomes, A, i.e.  
 
I   (A ; M) =  
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has the all-important property that the joint pragmatic information from independent 
message ensembles is the sum of the pragmatic information values from each ensemble.  
It is also the relative information of the probability distribution of outputs subsequent to 
the receipt of each message with respect to the prior distribution, averaged over all 
possible messages. 
 
Another problem with using (1) as a definition of pragmatic information emerges in the 
limit of long sequences.  Recall that the Noiseless Coding Theorem states that  
 
H  (P) ≤   E [lP(α)]   ≤  H  (P) + 1, 
 
where lP(α) is the length, in symbols, of the optimal (shortest) encoding of α.  Dividing 
through by N, the length of α, would give the exact result that the information rate, h, is 
exactly equal to the expected encoded length per symbol in the limit N → ∞, if the limit 
exists.  In the case of Shannon entropy, it does exist for all stationary sequences (Cover 
and Thomas, 1991).  In contrast, Shields (1992) shows that the corresponding “relative 
information rate”, limN→∞  N
-1D (P || Q) , need not exist. 
 
Also, Shannon’s result applies only to the expected length of the encoding, thus providing 
no assurance that any individual sequence will not have a markedly different compressed 
length.  The most general statement of the Noiseless Coding Theorem that could be 
hoped for is that effectively every sufficiently long symbol sequence would have the right 
encoded length, provided that it is generated from an ergodic source
4
.  That this is 
actually true is the content of the  
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 An ergodic source is, for our purposes, a stationary stochastic process in which no set, S, of symbol 
sequences is mapped via time translation onto itself, except for sets of zero probability and sets of 
probability one.  Note that stationarity requires that the probability of S  also remains invariant under the 
time translation.  Per Birkhoff’s ergodic theorem (Billingsly, 1978), these conditions guarantee that 
averages taken over a sufficiently long individual sequence will correspond to averages taken over the 
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Theorem (Shannon-McMillan-Breiman). 
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with probability 1 (Billingsley, 1977) for any ergodic source, α, generated from a 
finite alphabet. 
 
Note that log[P{ α0, α1, α2, … , αN-1}]/N is a random variable because α0, α1, α2, … , αN-1 
is a particular realization of a stochastic process.  Yet the Shannon-McMillan-Breiman 
(SMB) Theorem states that, in the limit as N → ∞, the length of the optimally encoded 
version of the substring is the (non-random) log of the probability of the observed 
substring, almost surely under P.  This is precisely the result needed to establish the 
strong form of the Noiseless Coding Theorem.  Indeed, per Cover and Thomas, (1991), 
the length, l(α0 … αN-1), of the optimal encoding of α0 thru αN-1, satisfies 
 
- log P{α0 … αN-1} ≤   l(α0 … αN-1)  ≤ - log P{α0 … αN-1} + 1, 
 
so 
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as required.  This result argues powerfully in favor of using Shannon’s definition as the 
per-symbol measure of information in a long message, especially since, per Barron 
(1985), the theorem remains true if α is a sequence of real random variables.  Clearly, a 
similar argument could be made for any definition of pragmatic information for which a 
similar result is true, and, as will be shown shortly, this is the case for the per-symbol 
version of (2).   
 
From Random Walks to Random Grammars 
 
The simplest kind of random symbol sequence is a sequence of independently chosen 
symbols, or, more generally, random real variables.   The only “information” in the 
sequence is which values were chosen for which position in the sequence, and the only 
parameters needed to characterize the process are the probabilities of observing these 
values.  Evidently, the pragmatic information that an observer would use in predicting 
subsequent values in the sequence, given its history, is zero, corresponding to the fact that 
a price series with independent changes is, by definition, weakly efficient.  Arguments 
over whether markets really are  efficient have been raging for decades in such works as 
A Random Walk Down Wall Street (Malkiel, 1991) and A Non-Random Walk Down Wall 
                                                                                                                                                                             
ensemble of all such sequences.  Otherwise, it is possible that even stationary processes could get trapped 
in some subset of the ensemble. 
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Street (Lo and MacKinlay, 1999).  Previous attempts to resolve such arguments generally 
assume certain kinds of intertemporal dependence, such as serial correlation.  
Nevertheless, true market efficiency rules out any kind of intertemporal dependence, 
including that implied by the “technical analysis” of complex price patterns (Murphy, 
1999).  
 
A step up in complexity is the class of symbol sequences generated by a Markov chain, in 
which successive symbols are chosen as a function of a finite number, n, of previous 
symbols.  Again, the class of such random processes can be generalized somewhat by 
allowing each symbol to be a real valued random variable.  Textbook treatments of 
Markov processes almost always consider so-called first order Markov processes, in 
which the probability that a value appears in the sequence can only depend on the value 
immediately preceding it.  While first order Markov processes can be generalized to so-
called n
th
 order Markov processes, in which the probability that a value appears in the 
sequence depends on the n values immediately preceding it, n
th
 order Markov processes 
are isomorphic to vector valued first order processes.   Therefore, k step transition 
probabilities for n
th
 order Markov processes also decay exponentially with k.
 
 
Trading systems are often built on rules such as “if a price exceeds a given threshold, 
then sell,” rules which are effectively the transition rules of a finite state automaton.  
Also, most popular models of price volatility are Markov processes.  Typical of these is 
the familiar univariate GARCH(1,1) process, effectively a random walk with variable 
step size, given at step n by  
 
Rn = R0 + σ n-1 B n 
Pn = (1 + R n-1) P n-1 
σ2n = α σ
2
 n-1 + β σ
2
0 + γ R
2
n, 
 
where R0, α,  β, and γ are constants and Pn, Rn, and σn are, respectively, the price, per-
period return, and per period volatility.  Bn is a normal random variable with mean zero 
and unit variance in the time units of the problem.  Again, all of these processes are 
characterized by exponential decay of transients. 
  
However, financial markets consist of literally millions of coupled trading systems, both 
explicitly implemented in computer software and implicit in human traders’ minds.  It 
therefore seems likely that a more complex stochastic process would emerge.  There is, in 
fact, a large literature suggesting fractal and/or multi-fractal scaling in financial markets, 
including an analysis of over a million increments of the Standard and Poor’s 500 Index 
from the years 1984-1989 (Mantegna & Stanley, 1995).  This literature includes a series 
of models in Calvet and Fisher (2008), in which transients decay as an inverse power of 
the elapsed time, rather than exponentially. 
 
It is precisely because financial markets could exhibit these more complex kinds of 
dependencies that a study of the pragmatic information of historical price series for 
predicting future prices is relevant. 
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Limit Theorems for Pragmatic Information 
 
In this section, we establish first, a version of the “wrong code theorem” for pragmatic 
information, proving along the way that a pragmatic information rate for stationary 
sequences and stationary side messages must exist.  For ergodic sequences, we need only 
quote the known result that, just as with the Shannon-McMillan-Breiman Theorem, the 
pragmatic information rate is, in the limit of long sequences and side messages, the 
observable increase in the entropy rate of the sequence. 
 
First, the formal statement of the 
 
“Wrong Code” Theorem for pragmatic information.  Suppose an encoding of 
a finite symbol string α that would be optimal assuming the wrong probability 
measure Q(α) is used in place of the optimal encoding.  Suppose further that, 
given the (random) side message μ, the actual probability of observing α could 
be determined to be P(α = A | μ = m).  Then Eμ[l(α)] , the expected length of the 
resulting encoding, averaged over all possible side messages μ, satisfies the 
bounds 
 
H  (α | μ) + I (α; μ)  ≤   Eμ[l(α)]   ≤  H  (α | μ) + I (α; μ)  + 1, 
 
where H  (α | μ) is the conditional entropy of α, given side message μ,  I (α; μ) is 
defined as in (2), and l(α) is the length, in symbols, of the encoding of α using Q. 
 
Proof:  Let μ be one of the possible side messages, and write Pμ and Eμ in place of the 
more cumbersome P(α | μ) and EP(α | μ) , respectively.  As guaranteed by the Wrong Code 
Theorem of Cover and Thomas (1991), 
 
H  (Pμ) + D (Pμ || Q)  ≤   Eμ [l(α)]   ≤  H  (Pμ) + D (Pμ || Q)  + 1. 
 
Recalling that μ is, in fact, one possible value of the random variable μ and taking 
expectations over this random variable, the resulting inequalities are 
 
Σμ φμH  (Pμ) + Σμ φμ D (Pμ || Q)  ≤   Σ μ φμEμ [l(α)]   ≤  Σμ φμH  (Pμ) + Σμ φμ D (Pμ || Q)  + 1. 
 
The first two sums in the leftmost and rightmost inequalities are, respectively, H  (α | μ) 
and I (α; μ) , and the expectation in the middle sum is indeed Eμ [l(α)].  ■ 
 
The next step is to consider what happens to pragmatic information in the limit of long 
sequences.  However, we must also consider what happens with the side messages, as 
different applications seem to demand different versions of the limit.  For example, a 
receiver/decision maker may have already received an entire side message μ before any 
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output information is generated, perhaps because the set of possible side messages is 
finite.  We are then interested in 
NN
1
lim

 I (α1 … αN; μ).  Another possibility is that the 
decision maker is adding characters to the α sequence information at the same time it is 
receiving information via characters in μ.  In this case, we are interested in 
NN
1
lim

 I (α1 
… αN; m1 … m N).  In contrast to relative entropy, these limits do exist, per the  
 
Existence Theorem for Pragmatic Information Rates for Stationary 
Processes.  If n is the length of α,  the limits 
nn
1
lim

I (α1 … αn; μ), 
nn
1
lim

I (α; μ1 … μ n), 
n
lim I (αn | α1 … αn-1; μ), 
n
lim I (α1 … αn; μ n |   μ 
1 … μ n-1) , and 
nn
1
lim

 I (α1 … αn; μ1 … μ n) all exist, thus justifying the use of the 
notation i(α; μ) to represent the common limit. 
 
Proof:  The proof of the existence and equality of the first and third limits parallels the 
proof of the existence and equality of the two versions of the entropy rate, 
nn
1
lim

 H  (α1 … 
αn) and 
n
lim  H (αn | α1 … αn-1).  Additional details can be found in Cover and Thomas 
(1991). 
 
As with the entropy rate, the terms in the sequence comprising I (αn | α1 … αn-1; μ), for a 
fixed random variable μ , are monotonically decreasing towards zero with increasing n, 
since we must have, for stationary α, 
 
0 ≤ I (αn | α1 … αn-1; μ)  ≤  I (αn | α2 … αn-1; μ) = I (α n-1 | α1 … αn-2; μ). 
 
A basic theorem in real analysis guarantees that such sequences converge to a definite 
limit.  Another such theorem also guarantees that Cesaro sums of convergent sequences 
converge to the limit of the summands.  Since the chain rule for mutual information,  
 
nn
1
lim

 I (α1 … αn; μ) = 


N
i
n n 1
1
lim I (αi | α1 … αi -1; μ), 
 
is such a sum, the sequence of such left sides must also converge to the same quantity, 
which we denote as i(α; μ). 
 
The convergence of the second and fourth limits follows from the complete symmetry 
between side messages and what we have called “actions”.  The convergence of the fifth 
follows from the fact that  
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nn
1
lim

 I (α1 … αn; μ 1 … μ n) =  
nn
1
lim

[H  (α1 … αn) + H  (μ 1 … μ n) – H  (α1 … αn; μ 1 … μ n)]   
 
and that the individual limits of the three terms on the right exist and sum to the quantity 
defined as i(α; μ) above.  ■ 
 
We can then use the above results to conclude that 
 
i(α; μ) = 
nn
1
lim
  
EP [lQ(α) - lP(α; μ)], 
 
where lP(α; μ) is the length, in symbols, of the optimal (shortest) encoding of α because it 
uses the information in μ to determine the actual probability distribution of α.  In 
contrast, lQ (α) is the length, in symbols, of an encoding of α using Q(α), the probability 
distribution that would be used for encoding without benefit of μ.  This result is sufficient 
to conclude that, for all stationary α and μ, the pragmatic information rate is precisely the 
expected improvement in the length per encoded symbol as the result of receiving μ. 
 
The equivalent to the Shannon-McMillan-Breiman Theorem for mutual information does 
not seem to be named after anyone.  We therefore state it as the 
 
Ergodic Theorem for Mutual Information Rates (Barron, 1985).  Let Pα be the 
probability measure of the ergodic random sequence α,  let Pμ be the 
probability measure of the ergodic random sequence μ,  and let Pα, μ be the 
joint probability measure of the ergodic random sequences α and μ.  Then, 
with Pα, μ probability one,  
 
 
   
 




,
,
log
1
lim
,
i
PP
P
nn
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In particular, with probability one in the measure Pα, μ, 
 
i(α; μ) = 
nn
1
lim

[lQ(α) - lP(α; μ)]. 
  
Note that α and μ can be either finite alphabet or real valued stationary processes. 
 
A point that was insufficiently emphasized in previous work about pragmatic information 
is the tie-in with the theory of noisy communications channels.  Central to the latter is a 
careful formalization of an information source and a communications channel.  The 
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source is characterized by the probability triple, (Y, Y, ψ), consisting of a probability 
space Y, the collection, Y, of measurable subsets of Y, and the relevant measure, ψ.  Gray 
(2009) defines the formal channel as the triple [Y, νy, Z] , where Y and Z are probability 
spaces and, for each y ε Y, νy is a probability measure on Z, the collection of measurable 
subsets of Z.  The subscript attached to νy captures the intuition that there will be different 
probabilities of receiving z ε Z, depending on which y was sent.  All of this formalism 
makes possible the definition of what Billingsley (1978) calls the “input-output measure,” 
Ψ as 
 
     dyCCB
B
y  ,  
 
for each B in Y and C in Z.  If the receiver could know the channel input, y0 , y1,  … yn-1, 
the amount of information transmitted through the channel would be H  (y0 , y1,  … yn-1), 
computed via the measure μ.  However, the receiver only knows the channel output, z0 , 
z1, … zn-1, so the actual amount of information transmitted is  
 
I (y0 , y1, … yn-1; z0 , z1, … zn-1) = H  (y0 , y1, … yn-1) – H  (y0 , y1, … yn-1| z0 , z1, … zn-1), 
 
i.e. the reduction in the uncertainty of the original message, less the remaining 
uncertainty, given the output of the channel, computed using Ψ.  In other words, the 
amount of information transmitted is precisely the pragmatic information of the input and 
output of the channel.   
 
An Application to Portfolio Management 
 
Following Cover and Thomas (1991), we apply the above results to the ongoing 
performance of a portfolio of M assets that we are allowed to trade at the beginning of 
each period.  Let the fraction of the portfolio allocated to the m
th
 asset at the n
th
 period be 
0 ≤ bn
m
 ≤ 1, with Σm bn
m
 = 1 and suppose that no short sales are allowed.  Denote the so-
called “wealth relatives” of the assets for the nth period as the (random) vector Xn, where 
the wealth relative of each asset at each period is the ratio of its price at the beginning of 
the period to its price at the end.  It follows that each component of Xn and bn  are non-
negative real numbers and that the value of the portfolio at the beginning of the N
th
 period 
(for N > 0) is 
 



N
n
n
T
nNS
0
.Xb  
 
Cover and Thomas define the doubling rate  
 
,
log2







N
S
W NN E  
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and consider the limit of WN as N → ∞, after a suitable warning that the limit may or may 
not exist.  One sufficient condition for the limit to exist is if Xn is ergodic and exactly one 
of the components of Xn has a non-zero value for each n (the so-called “horse race”, a 
generalization of the more familiar Kelly criterion).  Then
5
, the fractional change in the 
portfolio after the n
th
 race is ∑ i bi Xi (n), where the random variable Xi(n) is defined as  
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with probability pi(n).  In general, pi(n) and bi can depend on previous races, as well as 
other history-specific conditions, though we assume that Ri cannot.  In any case, for a 
single race, 
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By setting qi = 1/(RiT), with Σk (1/Ri) = T, we ensure that 0 ≤ qi ≤ 1, for all i, and that Σk 
qk = 1.  We can therefore interpret the q’s as “track probabilities,” the odds that the 
bookies are prepared to offer.  The appropriate substitutions give 
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where we have introduced the notation p(n) for the vector of the pi(n)’s, q for the vector 
of the qi’s, and b for the vector of the bi’s.  The case where T = 1 corresponds to the 
situation where the race is fair with respect to the track probabilities (and is the case 
considered by Cover and Thomas).  Indeed, for T = 1 and the bet allocations bi = qi, S(n + 
1) = S(n) for all n and for all values of the X’s.  When T > 1, the race is rigged against the 
bettor, who can only make money (via a positive doubling rate) if his betting allocation is 
a better estimate of p(n) than the track probabilities q.  This is the situation of a “price 
taker” who must buy at an “offered price” that is higher than the market maker’s selling 
or “bid price” and who must sell at the market maker’s “bid price” (Figure 1 graphically 
illustrates the relevant conventions.).  On the other hand, when T < 1, the race is rigged in 
favor of the bettor, who can make money with estimates of p(n) no better than, and 
perhaps even somewhat worse than q.  This is the situation of the market maker, who 
buys at the bid and sells at the offer.  However, regardless of the value of T, the best 
policy for the bettor is always to choose b = p(n) because  
                                                          
5
 For M = 2, this model corresponds to the situation where a trader has decided to commit a portion b < 1 of 
his wealth in the hope of realizing a gain of bR, with R > 1, the usual Kelly criterion situation   It is the 
experience of the author that professional traders actually think this way.  Sometimes, a trader might decide 
to close out a trade at one or more intermediate points, i.e. before either b is lost or bR is won, a situation 
that can be incorporated into the present model by assuming that M > 2. 
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with equality if and only if b = p(n).  The optimal doubling rate after N races is therefore  
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We note that (log2
 
SN)/N → WN* almost surely as N → ∞ if Xn, the sequence of race 
outcomes, is ergodic.  Note also that, in the special case where qi = 1/M for all i (“even 
odds” for each horse), the above expression for the optimal doubling rate approaches log2 
M – h, where h is the per-symbol entropy of the sequence of race outcomes, shown to 
have a definite value by the Shannon-McMillan-Breiman Theorem.  We recognize the 
quantity log2 M – h as the channel capacity associated with the probability vectors p(n). 
 
Pragmatic information enters the picture by supposing that the factors that influence p(n) 
at the n
th
 race are made available to the bettor via a “side message”, μ(n), which could 
include such things as the previous history of the process.   We reflect the knowledge of 
these factors by re-writing p(n) as p
(μ)
, the probability vector given the side message μ 
(with its argument n suppressed) with components (p1|μ, p2|μ, …, pM|μ).  At the n
th
 race, we 
now have  
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It follows that at the n
th
 race, the bettor should choose b = p
(μ)
 for all n.  If φµ is the 
probability of side message µ, the optimal expected doubling rate, now averaged over all 
such side messages, is given by 
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Comparing the above expression for WN* with the equivalent expression without side 
information, we see that the additional term in the former is precisely the pragmatic 
information of the side messages.   Furthermore, if the side messages are an ergodic 
message stream, then, once more, the convergence, as N → ∞, of (log2
 
SN)/N to its 
expected value is almost sure. 
  
In the more general case where more than one of the Xi’s can be positive, and X is merely 
stationary, Cover and Thomas’s only guidance as to finding the optimal allocation is that, 
if cn(X) is optimal and an(X) is another allocation, then E[an(X)
 T
 X n / cn(X)
 T
 X n] ≤ 1.  
Nevertheless, if bn(X)
 
is optimal, given side information μn, and cn is optimal without it, 
the mutual information between  μ and X still bounds the difference in the optimal 
doubling rates, Wb – Wc = Δ W, provided the expectation is taken over both μ and X.  In 
demonstrating this result, let f(vn | Xn, μn) be the conditional density of Xn, given Xn and 
μn, g(vn | Xn) for the conditional density of Xn, given only Xn, and let φ(μn) be the 
unconditional density of μn.  It is also convenient to suppress the X dependence of b and 
c.  We have, if we use subscripts for variables over which expectations are taken, 
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The first line of the above set of equations represents a re-writing of the expectation of 
the definition as an iterated expectation.  The second line uses the fact that we don’t 
change the second term on the right side if we take expectations over a variable upon 
which nothing in that second term depends.  Upon explicitly writing out the inner 
expectation in the third equation, we have 
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We can re-write the argument of the logarithm above as 
 
 
 
 
  












nn
nnn
nnn
nn
n
T
n
n
T
n
n
T
n
n
T
n
g
f
f
g
Xv
mXv
mXv
Xv
vc
vb
vc
vb
|
,|
,|
|
2
loglog2 ,  
 
from which it follows that the integrals in the above sum can be re-written as  
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The second term in the right of the last equation is the conditional pragmatic information 
of Xn and μn, given Xn.  For the first term in the above equation, Jensen’s inequality 
allows us to write 
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Recall that cn is the optimum allocation for the n
th 
period if the side information is 
unavailable and that g(vn) is the conditional density of Xn, regardless of side information, 
a situation in which bn is not necessarily optimal.  As a result,  
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We conclude that  
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as claimed. 
 
An Application to Market Efficiency 
 
As suggested previously, pragmatic information can be a useful tool in the study of 
financial market efficiency.  A physical system in equilibrium is characterized by being 
in a state of maximum entropy.  Similarly, markets are in equilibrium when there is no 
possibility of arbitrage, since the pragmatic information of the future, given the past is 
zero. As Figure 1 makes clear, a well defined equilibrium price, Pi (t), exists for a security 
only at those moments when the best bid is at least as large as the best offer, and, even 
then, that price exists only for the exact position size that was traded.  The rest of the 
time, the best that can be said is that the existence of a bid/offer spread implies that 
prices, and thus equilibria, are “noisy”, in a sense we now make precise.   
 
The previous discussion shows that the per-symbol rate  
 
h (P) – h (P | μ) = i(P ; μ) 
 
exists almost everywhere under the input-output measure, and that it represents the rate at 
which a market converts economically relevant information, μ, into prices, P.   We are 
therefore justified in identifying market efficiency with the statement that  
 
h (P) – h (P | μ-) =  i(P ; μ-) = 0. 
 
Here, μ- represents economically relevant information known in the “tradable past”, i.e.   
the past separated from the present by the (ever decreasing) lag between the time we 
acquire economically relevant information and the time we can utilize this information in 
a trade.  If i(P ; μ-) = 0, then h (P) = h (P | μ-), implying that a knowledge of the “tradable 
past”  tells us nothing worth knowing about present prices.  In fact, this is demonstrably 
not true, as we now show.  
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In comparing their multifractal model to GARCH(1,1) price dynamics, Calvet and Fisher 
(2008) state that “GARCH(1,1) is often viewed as a standard benchmark that is very 
difficult to outperform in forecasting exercises.”  Another, even more widely used 
benchmark for financial modeling is the normal distribution of returns.  Accordingly, we 
choose a GARCH(1,1) process with normally distributed returns for a study of i(P ; μ-). 
 
Cover and Thomas (1991) give the formula h (P) = ½ log2 (2π e σ02) for the entropy (in 
bits) of the unconstrained  distribution of returns, where e has its usual meaning as the 
base of natural logarithms and σ0 is the unconstrained volatility of returns.  The 
appearance of σ0 in this formula should not be surprising, because it is a reasonable proxy 
for uncertainty in returns on an absolute scale
6
.  Similarly, h (P | μ-), the entropy of 
returns, conditional on the tradable past, is ½ log2 (2π e σn
2
), given that  
 
σn
2
 = α σn-1
2
 + β σ0
2
 + γ Rn
2
   . 
 
Since we must have α + β + γ = 1 to ensure that σ2 n remains positive and finite,  
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If Rn is a stochastic process, then both σn and the above expression must also be 
stochastic.  It therefore makes sense to take expectations.  We thus obtain 
 
                                                          
6
 as opposed to the logarithmic scale used by entropy. 
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where the inequality in the second line follows from Jensen’s inequality, and the 
expectations are zero by the assumption of stationarity.  Because h (P) ≥ h (P | μ-), we 
must have E[i] ≥ 0 in any case.  However, Jensen’s inequality is strict except for the 
unlikely scenario in which σn = Rn  = σ0 almost surely.  In all other scenarios, we 
conclude that E[i] is strictly positive always, and thus i itself must be strictly positive, at 
least some of the time. 
 
But the real advantage of the present formulation of market efficiency is the possibility of 
actually quantifying the amount of inefficiency and investigating where significant 
sources of inefficiency arise.  For example, in most estimates of the GARCH(1,1) model, 
α is significantly larger than γ, which corresponds to the intuition that the predictability of 
volatility plays a greater role in any market inefficiency than the predictability of price 
because volatility is the more abstract quantity.  More comprehensive studies of the 
observed pragmatic information in various markets, possibly gleaned from the 
compressibility of various price series, might provide additional details about how real 
markets approximate the ideal of efficiency. 
 
The Noisy Coding Theorem as a Phase Transition and What that Means for Finance 
 
As indicated in the Introduction, the primary goal of this paper is to identify the 
appropriate pragmatic information theoretic parallels to the Noiseless Coding Theorem of 
standard information theory.  In this section, however, we briefly consider the most 
significant result in information theory, namely, Shannon’s Noisy Coding Theorem 
(Cover and Thomas, 1991; Gray, 2009).  According to this theorem, there exists a precise 
“channel capacity”, C, such that information can be transmitted at any rate R < C with 
arbitrarily small probability of error.  In contrast, if R > C, the probability of error is 
bounded away from zero.  In general, C will depend on both the channel and ψ, the 
probability measure of the input signals.  The ψ dependence is eliminated by defining the 
“channel capacity”, C, as 
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C = sup ψ(Y) [h (Y) – h (Y | Z)], 
 
where the supremum is taken over all probability measures, ψ (Y) , of input signals, Y, 
and the entropy rates h (Y) and h (Y | Z) are given by  
 
h (Y) = 
nn
1
lim

[H  (Y1 … Yn)] 
and  
 
h (Y | Z) = 
nn
1
lim
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[H  (Y1 … Yn | Z1 … Zn)], 
 
respectively.   
 
The proof of the Noisy Coding Theorem usually assumes that the channel is memoryless, 
in that the output of the channel depends on neither previous inputs nor previous outputs.  
If the supremum in the definition of the channel capacity is over all ergodic or stationary 
sources, this assumption is justified, because it can be shown that feedback from previous 
inputs does not increase the channel capacity.  However, if only normally distributed 
signals are input, feedback does increase channel capacity.  Perhaps feedback or a 
channel with memory would increase channel capacity for sources restricted either to 
GARCH processes or multi-fractal processes.  It is certainly true that a receiver can alter 
the statistical characteristics of an input signal.  For example, the output of a finite state 
machine (Hopcroft, et. al., 2006) that receives a sequence of independent input random 
variables is a Markov Chain, as the probability of a specific output will, in general, 
depend on the previous state of the receiver. 
 
The significance of the Noisy Coding Theorem in its original context is that the channel 
capacity can be deduced from physical properties of the channel, such as its signal to 
noise ratio, etc.  Physical and psychological considerations might well determine a 
“channel capacity” in the financial context, as well, in that there is surely a limit to the 
rate at which investors can respond to changing market conditions.  What seems to be 
unique to the financial context is that investors are constantly re-evaluating what 
constitutes “signal” and what constitutes “noise”.  Perhaps more importantly, investors 
sometimes willfully ignore the realities of the market, as we saw so tragically in the run-
up to the current financial crisis.  We can treat such willful ignorance as an effective 
lowering of the channel capacity. 
 
In physics, phase transitions (sudden, qualitative changes in a physical system with small 
changes in temperature, pressure, or other state variable) are characterized by a 
discontinuity in the physical entropy of the system or its derivative with respect to that 
state variable (Thompson, 1979).  The Noisy Coding Theorem is effectively the statement 
that the mutual information has a discontinuous derivative with respect to the input 
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entropy rate at the channel capacity.  Since the input entropy rate to a communications 
channel is the analogue of the physical entropy, the Noisy Coding Theorem is therefore 
also the statement that there is a phase transition of the mutual information of the 
channel.  In fact, papers such as (Kabashima and Saad, 1999) study a class of error 
correcting codes using the detailed formalism developed to describe physical phase 
transitions.  These kinds of results are of interest because wide classes of systems seem to 
exhibit qualitatively and sometimes even quantitatively similar behaviors, irrespective of 
their detailed composition.  For example, the so-called quasispecies model of evolution 
(Eigen, 1971, Eigen and Schuster, 1979, Eigen, Schuster, and McCaskill, 1988) has an 
“error threshold”, a mutation rate above which selective advantages cannot be passed on 
to future generations.  This error threshold, which is effectively a phase transition 
(Campos and Fontanari, 1999), can also be viewed as an attempt by nature to transmit 
genetic information from one generation to the next at a rate that is faster than a genetic 
“channel capacity”. 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
As indicated in the Introduction, this paper is part of an ongoing investigation of the 
notion of “pragmatic information.”  One goal of this investigation, and one of the first 
goals of this paper was to establish that the mutual information between the input to a 
decision making process and the decisions that are output is a sensible definition of 
pragmatic information.  What seems novel about this view is that the actions made as the 
result of a decision are also part of the communications channel that transmitted the 
information to the decision maker.  This paper has shown that this kind of analysis can be 
extended to systems involving information rates. 
 
While the mathematics underlying mutual information is well known, the pragmatic 
information paradigm seems capable of providing new insight to apparently diverse 
phenomena.  In a previous paper (Weinberger, 2002), it was shown that a pragmatic 
information could be associated with a biological population and that the rate of its 
increase could be identified with the rate at which the population was evolving.  In this 
paper, we associated pragmatic information with optimal doubling rates of financial 
market returns and with a measure of market inefficiency.  We also saw that the run-up to 
a financial bubble can be characterized as a lowering of a pragmatic informational 
channel capacity.  Whether these ideas themselves contain any pragmatic information 
will only become clear as the result of further research.   
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FIGURE 1.  From market conditions to prices via countless individual trading 
decisions, resulting in the complex ecosystem of bid/s and offers that constitutes 
the price discovery process.  Note that both the “internal noise” of market 
rumors, bad judgment, etc. and the “external noise” of errors in economic data 
measurements, structural limitations in markets, etc. can both limit the precision 
of price discovery  
